By Tamara Nalubowa
The Supreme Court formally closed the book on Robert Kasibante’s challenge to the January 15, 2026 presidential election on Thursday after granting him leave to withdraw his petition against President Yoweri Museveni’s re-election.
While the bench unanimously allowed the withdrawal, it split sharply on whether Kasibante should shoulder legal costs.
The majority ordered that each party bear its own costs, shielding the petitioner from financial liability. But in a forceful dissent, Justice Christopher Madrama Izama warned that the court was departing from the clear wording of the Presidential Elections Act.
The 2026 results themselves were decisive. According to the Electoral Commission’s final declaration, President Museveni secured 7,946,772 votes, representing 71.65 percent of the valid ballots cast.
His closest challenger, Robert Kyagulanyi, garnered 2,741,238 votes or 24.72 percent. Far behind the leading pair, Nathan Nandala Mafabi polled 209,039 votes (1.88 percent), Mugisha Gregory Muntu 59,276 votes (0.53 percent), Frank Bulira 45,959 votes (0.41 percent), and Robert Kasibante 33,440 votes — just 0.30 percent of the national vote.
Mubarak Munyagwa received 31,666 votes (0.29 percent), while Joseph Mabirizi polled 23,458 votes (0.21 percent).
Kasibante finished sixth in an eight-candidate race, more than 7.9 million votes behind the declared winner.
Yet the central question raised by Justice Madrama’s dissent is not about electoral margins. It is about statutory command and judicial restraint.
The Presidential Elections Act provides that where a petitioner withdraws, he “shall” be liable to pay costs. In legal drafting, “shall” is typically interpreted as mandatory. For Justice Madrama, this was not a matter of discretion or political convenience but one of legislative fidelity.
“A candidate who initiates a national challenge such as this must have evidence robust enough to stand on its own and must be ready to take on the financial challenges that come with it,” he wrote, emphasizing that the court had no authority to dilute Parliament’s directive.
The majority reasoned that imposing heavy costs in a matter of profound public interest could deter future litigants from approaching the court. They framed their decision as a contribution to post-election reconciliation and national stability.
But Madrama countered that shielding a withdrawing petitioner risks encouraging speculative or performative litigation.
A presidential election petition is not an ordinary civil suit. It mobilizes the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Electoral Commission and extensive state resources.
It suspends political finality and places the national mandate under judicial scrutiny. When such a petition is withdrawn because the petitioner cannot meet the financial burden of sustaining it, the costs do not disappear.
They are absorbed by the public.
Justice Madrama’s concern, therefore, was institutional. If courts waive mandatory cost provisions in politically sensitive cases, they risk appearing to substitute equitable sympathy for statutory obligation. That, in his view, undermines predictability in electoral jurisprudence.
Kasibante had cited the prohibitive expense of prosecuting the petition as a reason for withdrawal. While that explanation evokes sympathy, it also strengthens the dissent’s logic: the law presumes that anyone invoking the country’s highest electoral remedy has prepared for its financial implications.
To allow withdrawal without consequence may lower the threshold for filing petitions in the first place.
The precedent question also looms large. In 2016, a similar petition was filed by John Patrick Amama Mbabazi after an election primarily contested between President Museveni and Kizza Besigye. Although Mbabazi had not been the top challenger, the petition process ran its full course and the court applied established cost principles. Consistency across electoral cycles strengthens public confidence in the judiciary’s neutrality.
None of this diminishes the constitutional right of any candidate, regardless of vote share, to challenge an election. The right to petition is fundamental. But rights are exercised within legal frameworks. Justice Madrama’s dissent suggests that accountability is part of that framework.
There is also a broader governance implication. If withdrawal carries no financial consequence, future candidates may treat presidential petitions as extensions of campaign rhetoric rather than rigorous constitutional contests. The Supreme Court could risk becoming a forum for political theatre instead of legal adjudication.
By contrast, enforcing statutory cost provisions does not bar legitimate petitions. It simply ensures that those who invoke the process do so with seriousness, preparedness and evidence capable of withstanding scrutiny.
In shielding Kasibante from costs, the majority opted for judicial discretion shaped by public interest considerations. In dissent, Justice Madrama insisted that fidelity to legislative language must prevail, even in politically charged contexts.
The divide reflects two visions of judicial responsibility: one that prioritizes flexibility in the name of reconciliation, and another that prioritizes strict adherence to Parliament’s command.
As Uganda moves beyond the 2026 election cycle, the petition may be over, but the jurisprudential debate it sparked remains alive. At stake is not merely who pays legal bills, but how firmly the courts anchor themselves to statutory text when politics presses hardest.
